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Abstract 
      The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of trade credit during the banking crisis 
in Japan.    Trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term external finance for 
small firms.    Previous literature has focused mainly on the substitution of bank loans for trade 
credit during monetary tightening among many firms, but in this paper we investigate the role of 
trade credit during the banking crisis.  The basic motivation is to explore whether the 
substitution hypothesis still holds even under serious financial turbulence.  Our main results 
suggest that the substitution hypothesis held in Japan when the banking sector was healthy, but 
broke down during the banking crisis.  More precisely, both bank loans and trade credit 
contracted simultaneously during the crisis.  Deteriorated bank health might have been 
primarily responsible for the widespread declines of credit to small and medium size firms in 
Japan during the banking crisis. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
   The Japanese economy experienced a prolonged slump after the collapse of the asset price 
bubble of the late 1980s.    Many studies have investigated the reasons why the slump had been 
so prolonged.    Although their conclusions vary, it is widely recognized that the problem of “bad 
loans” was a major source for “the lost-decade” in Japan.  Figure 1 shows the amounts of bad 
loans (risk management loans) of all banks and major banks from FY1992 to FY2003.    It is easy 
to see that bad loans started to increase in the early 1990s and continued to accumulate until 
2001, causing a large amount of losses related to the disposal of non-performing loans.  Small 
and medium companies faced particularly serious problems in finding alternative sources of 
funding during that financial turbulence. 
2  Standard macroeconomic adjustments did not 
work in solving the prolonged recession under the banking crisis. 
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      The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of trade credit during the banking crisis 
in Japan.    Trade credit is a short-term loan a supplier provides to its customer upon purchase 
of a product.  In previous literature, it was widely discussed that firms may substitute bank 
                                                                            
2  Fukuda, Kasuya, and Akashi (2008) investigated how large impacts impaired bank health had on default 
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loans with trade credit during monetary tightening.  Melzer (1960) showed that during 
monetary tightening in the United States, firms with relatively large cash balances increased the 
average length of time for which trade credit was extended.  Authors such as Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) questioned the robustness of Melzer’s 
“substitution hypothesis.”  However, several recent studies provide further empirical support 
for the substitution hypothesis (see, for example, Nielsen [2002], and Blasio [2005]).  Bank 
loans are important, but are not the only source of credit for small firms.  For firms in poorly 
developed financial markets, implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit may provide an 
alternative source of funds. 
3    Financially constrained small firms may raise working capital by 
borrowing more trade credit through delayed payment of their bills. 
4 
   As in the other industrialized countries, trade credit is a significant part of the balance 
sheets of Japanese firms.  This is particularly true for small firms that cannot rely on 
commercial paper as an alternative source of short-term credit.    Several authors thus explored 
whether the substitution hypothesis still holds in Japan (see, for example, Ono [2001], Ogawa 
[2003], and Uesugi and Yamashiro [2004]).   However, after the collapse of the Japanese stock 
market in the early 1990s, the Japanese banking sector began to face considerable problems, 
limiting its ability to renew loans and to extend new loans to firms.  The problems became 
especially serious in the late 1990s, when several major financial institutions turned out to be in 
default.    Deteriorating bank health had much larger impacts on small and medium firms, which 
relied on close banking relationships.    It is therefore interesting to explore whether small and 
medium size firms could substitute bank loans with trade credit even during the prolonged 
financial crisis in Japan.     
   Several previous empirical studies conclude that the role of banks in reducing the costs of 
financial distress did not work when bank health deteriorated in Japan.   For example, Gibson 
(1995) found that firm investment was sensitive to the main bank’s rating.  Kang and Stulz 
(2000) showed that firms that relied more on bank finance suffered significantly larger wealth 
losses during the first three years of the 1990s.    Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) found that 
the financial difficulties of Japanese banks reduced the number of FDI projects by Japanese firms 
into the United States.    During the prolonged financial crisis, the demand for trade credit was 
thus particularly large for small and medium size firms.     
   In previous literature, Petersen and Rajan (1997) emphasize that trade credit provides 
contractual solutions to information problems concerning product quality and buyer 
creditworthiness.  If supplies may have an advantage in some information gathering and 
monitoring over banks, trade credit may be able to overcome the financial distress of their 
                                                                            
3  Fisman and Love (2002) show that industries with a higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit 
higher rates of growth in countries with weaker financial institutions. 
4  The other motive for trade credit is the transaction motive.    For example, Ferris (1981) suggested that 
trade credit reduces the transaction costs of paying bills.    Delayed payment can facilitate exchange by 
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customers through giving a more stable, informed, and committed source of financing.  
However, using trade credit for finance can be a limited substitute to bank loans, partly because 
it is tied to the purchase of goods and partly because the supplier usually requires trade credit 
repayment, typically within a short period.    Furthermore, the customer’s trade credit provider 
is not a finance specialist.  Therefore, it may become reluctant to provide trade credit either 
when the default risk of its customers increases or when its credit availability is tightened. 
   In the following analysis, we investigate the role of trade credit in substituting declined 
bank loans under the banking crisis in Japan.    The environment and events in Japan provide a 
“natural experiment” that allows empirical testing.  First, because of the importance of the 
main bank system, many Japanese firms rely more on bank finance.  While the role of banks 
became relatively smaller for larger companies in the 1990s, banks continued to play a dominant 
role in the financing of smaller firms.  Second, Japan experienced a dramatic collapse in the 
financial condition of its banking system in the 1990s.  We should thus be better able to 
identify the impacts of negative shocks on default risk when a large amount of losses related to 
the disposal of non-performing loans damaged the financial health of many banks in the late 
1990s.    Third, suitable data are available to test the hypothesis based on bank- and firm-level 
data.  We obtained a detailed list of major lenders for each unlisted company from the Tokyo 
Shoko Research (TSR) Database Service.  We then matched borrowers’ financial data to the 
relevant financial data of the “main banks.”     
      In investigating the substitution hypothesis under the banking crisis, we estimate the fixed 
effect model (within-group estimator) by using unbalanced panel analysis for a sample of 4,555 
unlisted Japanese companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Given bank health measures, 
trade credit was negatively correlated with bank borrowings.  This implies that, without a 
banking crisis, the substitution hypothesis is supported for our small and medium size firms in 
Japan.    However, deteriorated bank health has various perverse impacts on trade credit. 
   In the estimation, we focus on two types of “main” banks for the health measures.  One is 
the “main” bank of the borrowing firm and the other is that of the main trade partner.  We 
show that the bank health of both types had significant impacts on trade credit.    Deteriorated 
bank health will damage borrowers through reducing their potential profitability and through 
increasing their default risk.  The trade credit thus declined when the borrower’s main bank 
faced problems associated with a financial crisis.  Deteriorated bank health would also affect 
the credit availability of the borrower’s trade partners.  When it risks potential credit 
availability of trade credit suppliers, it may reduce trade credit to small and medium size firms.     
   Our  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  After  presenting some macroeconomic evidence in Section 2, 
Section 3 specifies the basic model, and Section 4 explains our data.    Section 5 reports our main 
empirical results.  Section 6 extends the analysis, allowing for some health measures of trade 
partners.  Section 7 explores the impacts of “parent” companies.  Section 8 summarizes our 
main results and considers their implications.   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 31 
 
II.  Some  Macroeconomic  Evidence 
 
   Before analyzing disaggregated firm-level data, this section uses macro time-series data to 
view correlations between trade credit and bank loans in Japan.  Based on Financial Statements 
Statistics of Corporations by Industry, published by the Ministry of Finance, Figures 2-1 to 2-4 
report how trade credit (bills and accounts payable) and bank loans (short-term borrowings) 
grew from 1975 to 2004.  The data is annual growth rates of trade credit and bank loans to 
Japanese corporations with different capital sizes in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors.  Both figures show that both series have clear-cut cyclical movements, although 
growth rates declined substantially in the 1990s.     
   I n  t h e  f i g u r e s ,  i t  i s  w o r t h w h i l e  t o  n o t e  that the correlation of the two cyclical series 
alternated signs during the past decades.   The correlation was negative in the 1980s and early 
2000s.  For example, when pooling the data of corporations of all sizes, the correlation was 
-0.3405 in the 1980s and -0.6294 in the 2000s for all industries, -0.2224 in the 1980s and 
-0.3996 in the 2000s for the manufacturing sector, and -0.1324 in the 1980s and -0.6231 in the 
2000s for the non-manufacturing sector.    These negative correlations suggest that trade credit 
might have been a major substitutable source of finance in the 1980s and early 2000s. 
   In contrast, when using the 1980s data, the correlation was positive.  For example, when 
pooling the data of corporations of all sizes, the correlation was 0.1944 for all industries, 0.1125 
for the manufacturing sector, and 0.2653 for the non-manufacturing sector.  The positive 
correlations suggest that trade credit, on the contrary, declined simultaneously when bank loans 
declined in the 1990s.  The simultaneous declines of trade credit and bank loans were 
particularly serious in the late 1990s, when the banking crisis broke out in Japan.  In the late 
1990s, the lending attitudes of financial institutions became very tight, especially for small and 
medium companies.     
   The “Tankan Survey” of the Bank of Japan confirms that the lending attitudes of financial 
institutions became very tight in the late 1990s.  The lending attitudes for large companies 
were tight, but only temporarily.  The tight attitudes for small and medium companies, in 
contrast, persisted and showed slow recovery throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 
3).  The evidence suggests that, during the financial turbulence, small and medium companies 
faced serious problems in finding alternative sources of funding that might have been available 
during previous recessions. 
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Figure 2-1. Trade Credit and Bank Loans:
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Figure 2-2. Trade Credit and Bank Loans:
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Figure 2-3. Trade Credit and Bank Loans:
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Figure 2-4. Trade Credit and Bank Loans:
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III.    The Basic Model   
 
   In the following sections, we examine how various measures of bank health changed the 
amount of trade credit to Japanese unlisted firms.    The use of firm-level data of unlisted firms 
has several advantages in detecting the effects of bank health on the amount of trade credit.  
First, we should be better able to identify the impacts of shocks to the banking sector on firms 
that have stronger reliance on bank finance.    Second, reverse causality from firms to banks will 
be less of a problem in a firm-level regression for unlisted firms than it will be for listed firms.   
The borrower’s performance may affect the bank’s financial health if the firm’s loans from its 
bank were relatively large compared to the bank’s capital.  This is likely for listed firms but 
less likely for unlisted firms.  The use of unlisted firms’ data thus allows us to avoid possible 
simultaneous bias without using ad hoc instrument variables. 
      The basic equation we estimate in the following analysis is: 
TCi,t/Ai,t =  Yi,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  i,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  Di,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  Main1i,t+  Main2i,t + i, (1) 
where TCi,t = trade credit (bills and account payable), Ai,t = total asset, Yi,t = total sales,  i,t = 
profits, Di,t = bank borrowings, Main1i,t = main bank’s health measures of the borrowing firm, and 
Main2i,t = main bank’s health measures of the borrower’s main trade partner.    Subscript i is the 
firm index, and subscript t denotes time period t.    Equation (1) may be interpreted as a reduced 
form of demand and supply functions for trade credit. 
   The three explanatory variables, Yi,t,  i,t-1, and Di,t  are the financial conditions of the 
borrowing firm.    In the analysis, we normalize them dividing by the total assets.    It is natural 
that the amount of trade credit differs when the firm’s financial conditions are different.    Even   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 35 
if the total assets are the same, the firm would rely on more trade credit when its total sales are 
larger.  The transaction motive is the basis for a direct relationship between trade credit and 
the amount of the firm’s transactions.    We can thus expect the sign of  to be positive.    As for 
proxies of the individual firm’s profits, we use operating profits and special losses.  To the 
extent that firms with lower profitability need more trade credit, we expect that  < 0 for 
operating profits and  > 0 for special losses.    The coefficient of bank borrowings captures how 
bank loans are correlated with trade credit.    The substitution hypothesis relies on trade credit 
being an alternative to bank credit as a source of finance.    It would be negative when the firms 
substitute bank loans with trade credit.  The estimation examines the existence of negative 
correlations that control other conditions the firm faced.  In the estimation, we include both 
short-term and long-term borrowings as separate explanatory variables. 
      Each of the explanatory variables Main1i,t and Main2i,t denotes a vector of health measures of 
the “main” banks.  The health measures are key variables in the following analysis.  In the 
estimation, we focus on two types of main banks for the health measures.    One is the main bank 
of the borrowing firm.  Given a close bank-firm relationship, it is highly possible that the 
newly deteriorated health of the bank will reduce the borrowers’ potential profitability and 
increase their default risk.  To the extent that the trade partners are not financial specialists, 
the supply of trade credit may thus decline when the borrower’s main bank faces problems 
associated with financial crisis.  The other is the main bank of the borrower’s main trade 
partner.  Deteriorated health of the “main” bank may affect profitability of the trade partner 
through various channels.  To the extent that it risks potential credit availability, the trade 
partner would reduce trade credit to small and medium size firms. 
      There are several alternative proxies to measure bank health.    In the following analysis, we 
use two bank health measures: (i) ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and (ii) stock price.  
The first measure of bank health is the ratio of NPLs.  In Japan, banks sometimes 
underreported the amount of nonperforming loans on their books to conceal the true extent of 
their problems.  However, nonperforming loans continued to accumulate until 2001, causing 
huge losses related to the disposal of non-performing loans for the banks.  As a result, NPL 
ratios were regarded as an important indicator of bank health throughout the 1990s and into the 
early 2000s.  In particular, the Japanese government repeatedly warned the banks that it was 
imperative to solve the non-performing loans problems to recover confidence in Japan’s financial 
system.    It is thus highly possible that increases in NPL ratio would increase borrowers’ default 
risk through the tightening of lending attitudes among banks.     
   The second measure is the bank’s stock price, normalized by its book value.  Stock prices 
are indicators that reflect the market valuation  o f  b a n k s .   W h i l e  t h e  r a t i o s  o f  N P L s  a r e  
backward-looking, stock prices are forward-looking.  The forward-looking market valuation 
of the bank is sometimes volatile and deviates from its economic value.  However, the 
forward-looking measure has a preferable property, since what matters to the firm is the 36  S.Fukuda, M.Kasuya, K.Akashi / Public Policy Review 
availability of the bank’s help if it gets into financial distress. 
 
IV.  The  Data 
 
IV.1.    Data of Financial Variables 
 
   To estimate equation (1), we need firm-level data on financial variables, data on the 
measures of the bank health, information on the “main” bank, and information on major trading 
partners.  We collected the firm-level financial data of Japanese non-financial firms that are 
not listed on any stock exchange in Japan.    The data are taken from the Tokyo Shoko Research 
(TSR) Database Service.  The database covers all available financial data of non-financial 
corporations with capital of 100 million yen and over.  We, however, excluded firms whose 
relevant financial data were not available for five years in the data set.    We also excluded the 
da t a  of  p u bl ic  o r s e m i-public firms, non-profit organizations, firms that had no borrowings 
from banks, and firms for which relevant financial variables were missing or seemed unreliable.   
This approach allowed us to use the data of 4,555 Japanese unlisted firms. 
Table 1 reports average, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum of each financial 
variable.    The standard deviation is generally large, implying that a variety of firms exist in our 
sample.  However, comparing trade credit (bills and accounts payable) with short-term bank 
loans, we see that averaged trade credit is slightly larger than averaged short-term bank loans 
when normalized by total assets.  This means that trade credit was an important source of 
external funds for our sampled firms.  The profit rate is positive on average, but its standard 
deviation is very large.    Reflecting prolonged recessions during the 1990s, a minimum of profits 
takes large negative values, while a maximum of special losses takes large positive values.  
Health measures of the main banks and trade partners also have large standard deviations.  
Their averages are quite bad, and reflect the banking crisis. 
 
Table 1. Basic Statistics of the Financial Data 
average standard maximum minimum
 deviation
(Bills and Accounts Payable)/Total Assets 25.3 16.1 114.2 0.04
Sales/Total Assets 134.7 79.9 1353.8 1.4
Short-term Bank Loan/Total Assets 22.6 15.5 250.7 0.0004
Long-term Bank Loan/Total Assets 19.1 17.7 658.8 0.0006
Operating Profit/Total Assets 2.3 4.0 40.5 -99.0
Special Loss/Total Assets 1.9 4.9 396.7 0.00001
The Main Bank's Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Ratio 6.8 4.2 52.4 0.2
The Main Bank's Stock Price 572.2 414.1 1790.0 57.0
The Major Trade Partner's Operating Profit/Total Assets 2.1 2.9 35.5 -20.7
The Major Trade Partner's Average Stock Price 289.1 804.3 17450.0 10.0
NPL Ratio of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank 6.5 3.1 53.2 0.3
Stock Price of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank 755.4 449.9 1790.0 57.0
Note) The Major Trade Partner's Average Stock Price＝ (Maximum Stock Price + Minimum Stock Price)/2.    Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 37 
 
  Figure 4 shows scattered charts that plot trade credit (vertical line) and short-term bank 
loans (horizontal line) to our sampled firms for each fiscal year.    Each variable is normalized by 
total assets, and its logarithm is taken.  We can see some negative correlation in the simple 
correlation.  This implies that our sampled unlisted firms tend to rely more on trade credit 
when they have smaller short-term bank borrowings.    However, we can also see a large number 
of outliers that cannot be explained by a simple substitution hypothesis. 
 38  S.Fukuda, M.Kasuya, K.Akashi / Public Policy Review 
Figure 4. Simple Correlation between Trade Credit and Bank Loan
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IV.2.    Data on Measures of Bank Health 
 
      As for the two alternative measures of bank health, we constructed the data by the following 
steps.  First, we identified the name of the firm’s “main” bank based on CD Eyes, supplied by 
TSR Database Service.  CD Eyes provides a list of major lenders for each unlisted company for 
each year.    We defined the “main bank” as a bank that appeared first in the list for each year.   
We then collected the relevant financial data of the “main banks” from Financial Statements of All 
Banks, published by the Japan Bankers Association, Financial Statements of Shinkin Banks (Credit 
Cooperatives), published by the National Association of Shinkin Banks, and Financial Statements of 
Shinyo Kumiai (Credit Unions), published by the Community Bank Shinyo Kumiai.  The data set 
covers the period from 1996 through 2002. 
   To calculate a proxy for the ratios of NPLs, we used the amount of risk management loans 
divided by total loans outstanding.  Following the standards set by the Federation of Bankers 
Associations of Japan, each bank discloses the amount of “risk management loans” each year.  
Specifically, risk management loans are comprised of “overdue loans” in arrears by three months 
or more, and “restructured loans” with changes in terms and conditions, as well as loans to 
borrowers in legal bankruptcy. 
      In our data set, nearly 60 percent of the “main” banks are either city banks, long-term credit 
banks, or trust banks, and 33 percent of the main banks are first regional banks.    This implies 
that large banks still play dominant roles as main banks, even for most unlisted firms capitalized 
at 100 million yen and over in our sample.  Almost all of the unlisted firms in our sample, 
however, borrow from multiple banks; nearly 90 percent of the firms borrow from more than 
three banks, and nearly 65 percent of the firms borrow from more than five banks. 
 
IV.3.  Dummy  Variables 
 
   We added several dummy variables when the relevant bank health measures were missing.  
These dummy variables are the dummy for firms without a main bank, the dummy for firms that 
had no trade partners, and the dummies when either NPL ratio or stock price were not available 
for the main banks.    The dummy for firms without a main bank takes a value of one when the 
firm had no main bank, and zero otherwise.    In our sample, about 3 percent of the firms had no 
main bank.    Thus, by definition, we could not obtain our bank health measures for those firms.   
The dummy for no main-bank firms thus not only captures the effect that a weak bank-firm 
relation may have, but also identifies the impact that missing bank health measures may cause.     
   The dummies for no NPL ratio and no stock price take one when the main bank does not 
provide the corresponding data, and zero otherwise.  Even if the firms had a main bank, the 
main banks may provide neither the data of NPL nor stock prices when they are small, unlisted 
banks.    However, since more than 93 percent of the main banks are either city banks, long-term 40  S.Fukuda, M.Kasuya, K.Akashi / Public Policy Review 
credit banks, trust banks, or first regional banks, the number of such main banks was very small 
in our sampled firms.       
 
V.    Basic Empirical Results 
 
      We estimated the basic equation (1) by the fixed effect model (within-group estimator) with 
and without time dummies.  The use of the fixed effect model controls for firm-specific or 
industry-specific factors that may affect the amount of trade credit.   The estimation period is 
from 1997 through 2002.
5  Although data from some corporations were partially missing, we 
included them by using unbalanced panel analysis.    To avoid the problem of instantaneity bias, 
we took a lag of one period for independent variables except for Main1i,t and Main2i,t.  The 
estimation results appear in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Basic Estimation Results 
Dependent Var. = (Bills and Accounts Payable)/Total Assets              Coef. (standard err.)               Coef. (standard err.)
Sales/Total Assets 0.0231 (0.0016) ** 0.0211 (0.0016) **
Short-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0487 (0.0060) ** -0.0490 (0.0060) **
Long-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0546 (0.0056) ** -0.0592 (0.0055) **
Operating Profit/Total Assets -0.0689 (0.0130) ** -0.0839 (0.0129) **
Special Loss/Total Assets 0.0460 (0.0081) ** 0.0547 (0.0080) **
The Main Bank's Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Ratio -0.0350 (0.0109) ** -0.0218 (0.0103) *
The Main Bank's Stock Price/1000 0.0076 (0.0015) **           -
NPL Ratio of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  -0.0569 (0.0156) **           -
Stock Price/1000 of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  0.0120 (0.0014) ** 0.0036 (0.0014) *
Time Dummy (1997) 0.0231 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (1998) 0.0102 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (1999) 0.0133 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2000) 0.0179 (0.0012) **
Time Dummy (2001) 0.0007 (0.0012)
No Main Bank (MB) Dummy 0.0148 (0.0036) ** 0.0058 (0.0032)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's NPL Ratio) 0.0011 (0.0023) 0.0006 (0.0020)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's stock Price) 0.0018 (0.0018)           -
Unknown Dummy (the Major Trade Partner) 0.0044 (0.0021) 0.0017 (0.0017)
Unknown Dummy (NPL Ratio of Trade Partner's MB) -0.0142 (0.0039) **           -
Unknown Dummy (Stock Price of Trade Partner's MB) 0.0091 (0.0020) ** 0.0029 (0.0018)
Note: **,* denote staristical significance at the 1%,5% levels respectively.  
 
      Before discussing the bank health effects, we discuss whether the selected financial variables 
of borrowing firms have sensible impacts on trade credit.    All types of financial variables—Yi,t, 
i,t-1, and Di,t—have statistically significant impacts.  The sales-assets ratio has a positive 
impact, as expected, implying that the firm would rely on more trade credit as its transaction 
becomes more active.  Ordinary profits have a positive impact, while special losses have a 
                                                                            
5  Many companies close their books in March, but not all the companies covered by the analysis did so.   
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negative impact.    To the extent that less-profitable firms have smaller internal funds, the trade 
partner will provide more trade credit when the borrowing firm runs short of liquidity.     
   The coefficient of the bank borrowing-asset ratio is negative.  This is true not only for 
short-term borrowings but also for long-term borrowings.  This implies that our sampled 
unlisted firms tend to rely more on trade credit when they have smaller short-term and 
long-term bank borrowings.  The result is consistent with the substitution hypothesis, in 
which firms may substitute bank loans with trade credit.  However, when interpreting the 
coefficient, we need to note that other conditions are controlled for when obtaining a 
significantly negative sign.  In particular, the effects of alternative health measures of the 
“main” banks are not reflected in the coefficient. 
   The most noteworthy result in Table 2 is that the alternative measures of the bank health 
have statistically significant impacts.    Without time dummies, the coefficient of the NPL ratio 
is significantly negative, and that of the stock price is significantly positive both for Main1i,t and 
Main2i,t.    This implies that trade credit declined in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when either 
the “main” bank of the borrowing firm or the “main” bank of the borrower’s main trade partner 
faced financial difficulties.  When time dummies are included, the results become less 
significant.  But even with time dummies, the coefficient of the NPL ratio is significantly 
negative for Main1t and that of the stock price is significantly positive for Main2i,t.   
   The estimated equation is a reduced form of demand and supply functions for trade credit.  
We may generally need interpretations from both demand and supply sides.    However, it is less 
likely that the borrower reduces demand for trade credit when bank health is deteriorated.    It 
is thus natural to conclude that the impacts of Main1i,t and Main2i,t reflected shifts of the supply 
function under the banking crisis.  When firms rely on a close bank relationship, it is highly 
possible that deteriorated bank health will damage the borrowers through reducing their 
potential profitability and through increasing their default risk.  This is particularly true for 
small and medium size firms which have few alternative sources of finance.  The significant 
impact of Main1i,t implies that trade credit may decline when the borrower’s main bank faces 
problems under financial crisis.    Deteriorated bank health would also affect credit availability 
of the borrower’s trade partner.  For most of our sampled firms, the major trade partners are 
large firms that are less likely to face liquidity constrains under monetary tightening.  The 
significant impact of Main2i,t, however, suggests that even the large trade partners became 
conservative in supplying trade credit during the banking crisis.  Trade partners are not 
financial specialists; they did not serve as a lender of last resort when the banking crisis reduced 
their potential credit availability. 
   The above results provide a reasonable explanation of why the correlation between trade 
credit and bank loans became positive in the 1990s.  The Japanese banking sector faced 
considerable problems in the 1990s, which limited its ability to renew loans and to extend new 
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and medium size firms’ profitability and increased default risk.    It also increased the potential 
risk of liquidity constraints among trade credit suppliers.  A firm’s creditworthiness should 
affect how much credit it is offered.  Consequently, both bank loans and trade credit 
contracted simultaneously during the crisis.  The substitution hypothesis no longer held for 
unlisted Japanese companies during the financial turbulence of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
VI.    The Effects of the Major Trade Partner’s Health 
 
   In the last section, we showed that deteriorated bank health had perverse effects on trade 
credit to Japanese unlisted firms.  In particular, not only the health of the borrowing firm’s 
bank but also that of its trade partner affected the amount of trade credit under the banking 
crisis.  It is very likely that trade credit declines when its provider’s potential credit 
availability becomes tight.  Health of the trade partner’s bank would thus affect trade credit 
when it changes the trade partner’s credit availability.  However, health of the trade partner 
may be a more direct measure for credit availability.    This section examines whether the health 
measures of trade partners have additional effects on trade credit to unlisted borrowing firms.  
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
TCi,t/Ai,t =  Yi,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  i,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  Di,t-1/Ai,t-1   (2) 
+  Main1i,t+  Main2i,t +  Hi,t-1 + i,  
   where  Hi,t-1 = health measures of the major trading partner at period t-1.  Except  that  Hi,t-1 
is included, equation (2) is the same as equation (1). 
      There are several alternative proxies to measure the trade partner’s health.    In the following 
analysis, we use two health measures: (i) ratio of operating profits to total assets and (ii) stock 
price normalized by its book value.  The ratio of operating profit to total asset reflects the 
trade partner’s current profitability.    The current operating profit is usually a good predicator 
for its future profitability.  Its lagged value may proxy the amount of internal funds for the 
trade partner.    Stock prices are, in contrast, forward-looking indicators that reflect the market 
valuation of current and future profitability of the trade partners.  We calculated the stock 
prices by averaging their maximum and minimum in the last period. 
   We estimated the basic equation (2) by the fixed-effect model (within-group estimator) 
with and without time dummies.  The estimation period is from 1997 through 2002, although 
we use an unbalanced panel when the data are missing.    The estimation results appear in Table 
3.    The estimated five coefficients, , , , , and , were essentially the same as those in Table 2.   
In particular, the coefficient of the bank borrowing-asset ratio was negative.  The result, 
however, is consistent with the substitution hypothesis only when health measures of the 
“main” banks are controlled for.  As in Table 2, the impacts of Main1i,t and Main2i,t were 
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when the main banks faced financial difficulties. 
      The most noteworthy result in Table 3 is that the health measures of the major trade partner 
have only limited impacts on trade credit.    The profit ratio was not only insignificant but also 
had the wrong sign.  The stock price had a positive impact but its significance level was 
marginal.  The  less-significant impacts of Ht-1 are in marked contrast with significant impacts 
of Main2t.    The deteriorated health of the trade partner’s main bank led to a larger reduction of 
trade credit than that of the trade partner.   
      One possible explanation for this result is that most borrowing firms have several alternative 
sources of trade credit from various trade partners.  If they substitute with one another, 
borrowing firms could increase their trade credit from the other trade partners when the major 
trade’s health deteriorates.  In contrast, it is likely that trade partners have a common “main” 
bank, especially when they have a horizontal relationship.    The deteriorated health of the bank 
would thus have more widespread impacts on trade partners and squeeze trade credit among 
them. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results with Trade Partner's Health Measures 
Dependent Var. = (Bills and Accounts Payable)/Total Asset               Coef. (standard err.)               Coef. (standard err.)
Sales/Total Assets 0.0230 (0.0016) ** 0.0210 (0.0016) **
Short-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0486 (0.0060) ** -0.0490 (0.0060) **
Long-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0547 (0.0056) ** -0.0593 (0.0055) **
Operating Profit/Total Assets -0.0699 (0.0131) ** -0.0843 (0.0129) **
Special Loss/Total Assets 0.0464 (0.0081) ** 0.0548 (0.0080) **
The Main Bank's Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Ratio -0.0360 (0.0109) ** -0.0220 (0.0103) *
The Main Bank's Stock Price/1000 0.0071 (0.0016) **           -
The Major Trade Partner's Operating Profit/Total Assets -0.0082 (0.0258) -0.0038 (0.0256)
The Major Trade Partner's Average Logged Stock Price 0.0009 (0.0004) * 0.0005 (0.0004)
NPL Ratio of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  -0.0592 (0.0156) **           -
Stock Price/1000 of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  0.0104 (0.0015) ** 0.0037 (0.0015) *
Time Dummy (1997) 0.0233 (0.0015) **
Time Dummy (1998) 0.0105 (0.0015) **
Time Dummy (1999) 0.0137 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2000) 0.0183 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2001) 0.0011 (0.0013)
No Main Bank (MB) Dummy 0.0150 (0.0036) ** 0.0058 (0.0032)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's NPL Ratio) 0.0007 (0.0023) 0.0006 (0.0020)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's stock Price) 0.0013 (0.0018)           -
Unknown Dummy (the Major Trade Partner) 0.0058 (0.0027) 0.0038 (0.0024)
Unknown Dummy (the Trade Partner's Profit) 0.0026 (0.0023) 0.0018 (0.0023)
Unknown Dummy (the Trade Partner's Stock Price) 0.0016 (0.0026) 0.0043 (0.0027)
Unknown Dummy (NPL Ratio of Trade Partner's MB) -0.0134 (0.0039) **           -
Unknown Dummy (Stock Price of Trade Partner's MB) 0.0074 (0.0021) ** 0.0030 (0.0019)
Note: **,* denote staristical significance at the 1%,5% levels respectively.  
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VII.    The Role of “Parent” Companies 
 
   In general, the relationship with trade partners can be either vertical or horizontal.  In 
terms of information acquisition through transaction, neither type of relationship may make a 
big difference.    However, under a vertical relationship, the “parent” company is not only a trade 
partner but also a dominant equity holder.  The “parent” company may thus have more 
incentive to reduce the costs of financial distress for their buyers than the other trade partners.   
If this is the case, trade credit from parent companies may be a way for small firms with better 
access to alternative credit market.    The purpose of this section is to examine whether parent 
companies play any special role in providing trade credit. 
   Using a dummy variable, we examined whether parent companies may provide additional 
trade credit to unlisted borrowing firms.    We estimated the following equation:     
TCi,t/Ai,t =  Yi,t-1/Ai,t-1 + ( + Dummyi,t) i,t-1/Ai,t-1 +  Di,t-1/Ai,t-1   (3) 
+  Main1i,t+  Main2i,t +  Hi,t-1 +  Dummyi,t + i,  
where Dummyi,t = dummy variable for “parent” companies at period t.  The dummy variable 
takes one when the major trade partner is a major stock holder and zero otherwise.    We include 
Dummyi,t not only as a constant term dummy but also as a coefficient dummy of i,t-1/Ai,t-1.  
Except for the fact that the Dummyi,t’s are included, equation (3) is essentially the same as 
equation (2).  However, since the profit-total asset ratio of the major trade partner was not 
significant, we did not use it for Hi,t-1. 
   Table 4 reports the estimation results.  The estimated six coefficients, , , , , , and , 
are essentially the same as those in Table 3.    We can conclude that the substitution hypothesis 
holds only when the main banks are healthy and that trade credit declines when the main banks 
face financial difficulties. 
      The coefficient of Dummyi,t is positive but not statistically significant when it is included as 
a constant dummy.  This indicates that “parent” companies may provide slightly larger trade 
credit than the other trade partners, but the difference is very small.    In contrast, Dummyi,t has 
a significantly negative impact when we include it as a coefficient dummy of the profit-asset 
ratio.    The magnitude of the parent company impact is more than three times as large as that of 
the non- parent company impact.    A decline of the profit-asset ratio generally increases trade 
credit because firms with smaller cashflow need more credit.  But the significant coefficient 
dummy implies that “parent” companies increase more credit when the borrower’s profit 
declines.  To the extent that less-profitable firms have smaller internal funds, parent 
companies may be a special trade credit provider when the borrowing firm runs short of 
liquidity.   
      The above results suggest that at least part of the pattern of trade credit can be explained by 
the existence of “parent companies.”  To check the robustness of this hypothesis, it is   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 45 
constructive to include more coefficient dummies.    Table 5 reports the estimation results when 
adding Dummyi,t to Main1i,t and Main2i,t as coefficient dummies.  The constant dummy was 
excluded because it remained insignificant.    In the estimation without a time dummy, the stock 
price of the borrower’s main bank was significantly negative.  This may suggest marginal 
evidence that the parent company may increase its trade credit when the borrowing firm’s main 
bank faced problems.  However, the other coefficient dummies are not significant.  None of 
the coefficient dummies was significant with time dummies.  When bank health deteriorated, 
the role of “parent” companies, if there is any role at all, is very limited in substituting declined 
bank loans. 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results with "Parent" Company Dummy I 
Dependent Variable = (Bills and Accounts Payable)/Total Assets               Coef. (standard err.)               Coef. (standard err.)
Sales/Total Assets 0.0228 (0.0016) ** 0.0209 (0.0016) **
Short-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0488 (0.0060) ** -0.0491 (0.0060) **
Long-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0558 (0.0056) ** -0.0604 (0.0055) **
Operating Profit/Total Assets -0.0602 (0.0134) ** -0.0745 (0.0132) **
(Operating Profit/Total Asset)*Parent Company Dummy -0.1547 (0.0458) ** -0.1556 (0.0451) **
Special Loss/Total Assets 0.0475 (0.0081) ** 0.0559 (0.0080) **
Parent Company Dummy 0.0002 (0.0029) 0.0023 (0.0029)
The Main Bank's Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Ratio -0.0364 (0.0109) ** -0.0223 (0.0103) *
The Main Bank's Stock Price/1000 0.0071 (0.0015) **           -
The Major Trade Partner's Average Logged Stock Price 0.0006 (0.0003) * 0.0003 (0.0003)
NPL Ratio of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  -0.0585 (0.0156) **           -
Stock Price/1000 of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank  0.0103 (0.0015) ** 0.0036 (0.0015) *
Time Dummy (1997) 0.0233 (0.0015) **
Time Dummy (1998) 0.0104 (0.0015) **
Time Dummy (1999) 0.0136 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2000) 0.0183 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2001) 0.0011 (0.0013)
No Main Bank Dummy 0.0148 (0.0036) ** 0.0057 (0.0032)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's NPL Ratio) 0.0006 (0.0023) 0.0005 (0.0020)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's stock Price) 0.0013 (0.0018)           -
Unknown Dummy (the Major Trade Partner) 0.0042 (0.0023) 0.0026 (0.0018)
Unknown Dummy (the Trade Partner's Stock Price) -0.0001 (0.0022) 0.0030 (0.0023)
Unknown Dummy (NPL Ratio of Trade Partner's Main Bank) -0.0135 (0.0039) **           -
Unknown Dummy (Stock Price of Trade Partner's Main Bank) 0.0076 (0.0021) ** 0.0031 (0.0019)
Note: **,* denote staristical significance at the 1%,5% levels respectively.  
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Table 5. Estimation Results with "Parent" Company Dummy II 
 
Dependent Variable = (Bills and Accounts Payable)/Total Assets               Coef. (standard err.)               Coef. (standard err.)
Sales/Total Assets 0.0228 (0.0016) ** 0.0209 (0.0016) **
Short-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0486 (0.0060) ** -0.0491 (0.0060) **
Long-term Bank Loan/Total Assets -0.0560 (0.0056) ** -0.0603 (0.0055) **
Operating Profit/Total Assets -0.0597 (0.0133) ** -0.0750 (0.0132) **
(Operating Profit/Total Asset)*Parent Company Dummy -0.1624 (0.0460) ** -0.1508 (0.0446) **
Special Loss/Total Assets 0.0476 (0.0081) ** 0.0558 (0.0080) **
The Main Bank's Non-Performing Loan (NPL) Ratio -0.0345 (0.0110) ** -0.0225 (0.0108) *
(The Main Bank's NPL Ratio)*Parent Company Dummy -0.0234 (0.0411)           -
The Main Bank's Stock Price/1000 0.0076 (0.0016) ** -0.0014 (0.0017)
(The Main Bank's Stock Price/1000)*Parent Company Dummy -0.0110 (0.0051) * -0.0013 (0.0036)
The Major Trade Partner's Average Logged Stock Price 0.0006 (0.0003) * 0.0003 (0.0003)
NPL Ratio of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank (MB) -0.0639 (0.0160) **           -
(NPL Ratio of the Trade Partner's MB)*Parent Company Dummy 0.0729 (0.0441)           -
Stock Price/1000 of the Major Trade Partner's Main Bank (MB) 0.0102 (0.0015) ** 0.0038 (0.0015) *
(Stock Price of the Trade Partner's MB)*Parent Company Dummy  0.0049 (0.0040)           -
Time Dummy (1997) 0.0238 (0.0016) **
Time Dummy (1998) 0.0110 (0.0016) **
Time Dummy (1999) 0.0141 (0.0015) **
Time Dummy (2000) 0.0187 (0.0014) **
Time Dummy (2001) 0.0014 (0.0014)
No Main Bank Dummy 0.0152 (0.0036) ** 0.0062 (0.0036)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's NPL Ratio) 0.0006 (0.0023) 0.0006 (0.0023)
Unknown Dummy (the Main Bank's stock Price) 0.0012 (0.0018) -0.0016 (0.0018)
Unknown Dummy (the Major Trade Partner) 0.0039 (0.0023) 0.0027 (0.0018)
Unknown Dummy (the Trade Partner's Stock Price) -0.0001 (0.0023) 0.0030 (0.0023)
Unknown Dummy (NPL Ratio of Trade Partner's Main Bank) -0.0140 (0.0039) **           -
Unknown Dummy (Stock Price of Trade Partner's Main Bank) 0.0078 (0.0021) ** 0.0032 (0.0019)
Note: **,* denote staristical significance at the 1%,5% levels respectively.  
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 
  Trade credit is one of the most important sources of short-term external finance for small 
firms.    Trade credit may provide access to capital for firms that are unable to raise it through 
more traditional channels.  Suppliers may be better than specialized financial institutions in 
evaluating and controlling the credit risk of their buyers.    If this is the case, trade credit may 
be a way for small firms with better access to credit markets.  In this paper, we investigated 
the role of trade credit during the banking crisis in Japan.    The basic motivation was to explore 
whether the substitution hypothesis still holds, even under serious financial turbulence.  Our 
main results suggest that the substitution hypothesis held in Japan when the banking sector was 
healthy, but did not hold during the banking crisis.    Rather, both bank loans and trade credit 
contracted simultaneously during the crisis.  Using trade credit for finance can be a limited 
substitute to bank loans partly because it is tied to the purchase of goods and partly because the 
supplier usually requires trade credit repayment within a short period.  Furthermore, the 
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to provide trade credit either when the default risk of its customers increases or when its own 
credit availability is tightened.     
      One may argue that deteriorated bank health caused misallocation of credit not only through 
a credit crunch, but also through“evergreening” lending.  For example, Peek and Rosengren 
(2005) showed that troubled Japanese banks allocated credit to severely impaired borrowers to 
avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets.
6    It was probably true that troubled 
banks increased lending to some insolvent large firms.    However, it was less likely that they did 
so to small firms whose impacts on the banks’ balance sheets were negligible.    Fukuda, Kasuya, 
and Nakajima (2006) showed that evergreening lending did not prevail among small and medium 
size firms, whose credit quality is especially important in determining whether credit is offered.   
Deteriorated bank health may be primarily responsible for the widespread declines of credit to 
small and medium size firms in Japan seen during the banking crisis. 
 
 
                                                                            
6  In addition, Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2006) confirmed that zombie-dominated industries exhibit 
more depressed job creation, lower productivity, and greater excess capacity.    Fukuda and Koibuchi 
(2006) found that a lack of “shock therapy” was a source of the prolonged bad loan problem during 
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